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NON-CLASS GROUP LITIGATION UNDER EU
AND GERMAN LAW
HARALD KOCH*
In his contribution, Professor Walter described the basic obstacles to American-style class litigation in continental European civil
1
law systems. This Article will discuss what European Union and
German law does—or might do—to surmount these obstacles.2 First,
I will sketch the two basic models of collective interest representation
in European procedure (“European procedure” meaning civil procedure in different European legal systems and the impact of European
law on national procedure systems, infra Section I). Second, it is useful to note the most important substantive law fields in which group
litigation schemes in European countries are utilized (Section II).
Then, I will consider different types of group litigation (Section III)
and certain procedural conclusions that can be drawn from the foregoing comparative survey (Section IV). Finally, I will give the prospects for some of the central problems of European group litigation
and for its future development.
I. GROUP LITIGATION IN EUROPEAN PROCEDURES
The European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of
Consumers’ Interests presents a very topical background for the
European interest in group litigation and in comparative experiences
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1. See Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J.
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2. See generally Harald Koch, Class and Public Interest Actions in German Law, 4 CIV.
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(Erik Jayme ed., 1990).
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with it.3 The implementation of this Directive into national law was
due by the end of 2000. The Directive’s official title is a misnomer; it
is not so much the injunction remedy that characterizes the Directive,
but rather its procedural enforcement—by assigning rights of action
to “qualified entities,” which are either organizations (e.g., consumer
associations) or independent public bodies (e.g., administrative agencies)—that give it effect. Hence, even though the group litigation
topic does not appear in the Directive’s title, the associations’ suit is
the most important option the member states have in implementing
the Directive into their national law.
In Germany, the Directive was incorporated in June 2000 into
4
the Standard Contract Terms Act and the Unfair Competition Act,
which now provide a right of action for consumer associations (Verbandsklage) that are registered in a list drawn up by the Federal Administrative Office and communicated to the EC Commission. The
German legislature has not yet enacted a comprehensive and consistent law on collective remedies in a general procedural context, despite the recommendations of a number of renowned procedural experts.5 Rather, the Bundestag was content with a number of partial
and unsystematic supplements and corrections to several consumer
law statutes.6 However, the present Secretary of Justice, on the occasion of the Civil Code’s (BGB) centenary, proposed a complete revision of the Law of Obligations, which is the part of the BGB that is
under heavy European pressure. In this context, the introduction of a
more general chapter on collective remedies—either associated with

3. See EUR. PARL. AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 [hereinafter Directive 98/27/EC].
4. See Gesetz über Fernabsatzverträge und andere Fragen des Verbraucherrechts sowie
zur Umstellung von Vorschriften auf Euro [Statute on Distant-Sales Contracts and Other Consumer Law Questions as well as on Adaption of Regulations to the Euro] v. 26.06.2000, Bundesgesetzblatt [hereinafter BGBl.] I p. 897 [hereinafter Statute v. 26.6.2000] (incorporating in
addition the implementation legislation to the EC Distant Selling Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O. J.
(L 144) 19).
5. See, e.g., Norbert Reich, Diverse Approaches to Consumer Protection Philosophy, 14 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 257, 279 (1992); Peter Gottwald, Class Action auf Leistung von Schadensersatz nach amerikanischem Vorbild im deutschen Zivilprozess? 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER
ZIVILPROZESS [ZZP] 1-38 (1978); EIKE VON HIPPEL, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (3rd ed. 1987);
Harald Koch, Die Verbandsklage in Europa, 113 ZZP 413, 441 (2000).
6. See Statute v. 26.6.2000 supra note 4, (supplementing the Gesetz zur Regelung des
Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen [Standard Contract Terms Act] [hereinafter
AGBG] secs. 13, 22 and the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Unfair Competion Act]
[hereinafter UWG] sec. 13).
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consumer provisions of the BGB contract law or as a special proce7
dural statute—is being seriously considered.
The European Injunction Directive alternatively provides for
one of two different models of collective interest representation practiced in member states. The first is the vindication of non-individual,
diffuse, or public interests that can be distinguished from the accumulated interests and rights of individuals. This is characterized by
Consideration no. 2 of the Directive:
“Whereas current mechanisms . . . for ensuring compliance with
[consumer protection] Directives do not always allow infringements
harmful to the collective interests of consumers to be terminated in
good time; whereas collective interests mean interests which do not
include the cumulation of interests of individuals who have been
harmed by an infringement; whereas this is without prejudice to individual actions brought by individuals who have been harmed by
an infringement; . . . Parliament and Council have adopted this Di8
rective.”

This is the model most civil law associations’ suits are following,
and it is concerned primarily with certain substantive interests that
are entrusted to and can be pursued by these associations, such as
9
consumer protection, competition, or fair contract practices.
The other model of collective interest representation is group
litigation in the literal sense. In other words, the representation of a
specifically defined group of adversely affected people that either by
full assignment (contractual or statutory) or partial assignment (for
procedural purposes only) transfers the right of action to the repre10
sentative, a public trustee, or an association.
Both of these forms of group representation in Europe differ
from American and Canadian class actions in two important ways.
First, there is no method of self-appointment of an individual cham7. Cf. the federal government’s proposal for a “Statute modernizing the law of obligations” (Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) Aug. 4, 2000, Art. 3 (pp. 109 et seq.).
8. Council Directive 98/24/EC, Consideration no. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 11.
9. Cf. GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION - L’ ACTION COLLECTIVE ET LA
DEFÉNSE DES CONSOMMATEURS (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992); DIE BÜNDELUNG
GLEICHGERICHTETER INTERESSEN IM PROZESS, (Jürgen Basedow, et. al. eds., 1999); Bryant
Garth, Group Actions in Civil Procedure, in ACADÉMIE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ, XIIIE CONGRES INT. DE DROIT COMPARÉ, RAPPORTS GÉNERAUX 205 (Montreal
1990); Catherine Kessedjian, L’Action en Justice des Associations de Consommateurs, RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 281-300 (1997); Koch, supra note 5,
at 413–442.
10. In Europe, it seems that only England—and to a certain extent the Netherlands—have
accepted this model. See Ellger, Die Bündelung gleichgerichteter Interessen im englischen Zivilprozeß, in Basedow, et. al., supra note 9 at 109 et seq.; Koch, supra note 5, at 425.
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pion (plaintiff) and no concept of an individual private Attorney
General, whose initiative is fostered by fee incentives or by an alluring contingency fee arrangement. To be sure, this may be welldeserved because of the risk assumed and the attorney’s hard work;
however, in the European tradition—although this may be slightly
over-simplified—we entrust the public interest to public institutions
rather than to private law enforcers. By doing so, we must put up
with all of the problems of a poorly-motivated, cumbersome, and
perhaps understaffed bureaucracy, as well as the question of legitimacy of representation. Under such a system, the interests of individual victims of unlawful behavior tend to be neglected in larger and
more autonomous organizations. This is also true for large and
anonymous class actions, but is more of a problem with the Verbandsklage (associations’ suit) where special rules must secure the influence of those represented (information, res judicata and opt-out,
fair distribution of proceeds, etc.).
There is a second crucial difference between the class action and
the European style collective actions, and that is the latter’s emphasis
on injunctive relief rather than on damages (although in some countries, damages, especially symbolic and non-material, can also be
sought by an association).11
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW FIELDS OF APPLICATION
This Section provides a short survey of the most important substantive law fields in which group litigation in Europe occurs. In
Germany, the Verbandsklage is granted a unique and exceptional position in the doctrine of procedure, as it does not purport to enforce
solely individual, subjective rights, which would be the usual designation of a civil procedure’s function. This exceptional status is reflected in the lack of a general concept or rule of association action in
civil procedure. Rather, an association’s right of action is only provided in some special substantive law contexts, such as certain statutes concerning business self-regulation, consumer protection, labor
law, industrial property, and environmental protection.12

11. For example, in France, Greece and Spain. See Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken & Nicole
Franke, Die action civile der Verbände in Frankreich; Anastasia Papathoma-Baetge, Die Verbandsklage im Griechischen Recht; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Die Verbandsklage in Spanien, in Basedow et al., supra note 9; Koch, supra note 5, at 425-426.
12. See Koch, Group and Representative Actions in West German Civil Procedure, supra
note 2, at 28.
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Coming back to the European Injunction Directive, it confines
itself from the outset to consumer protection, and in an annexed
schedule, it lists nine special Directives and indicates those violations
of specific consumer interests that are subjected to injunctive action
made available to independent public institutions or consumer associations. This schedule can be divided into three groups:
Protection from misleading and perilous advertising
Certain sales practices such as door-to-door sales or distance
selling
Unfair contract practices in general and in special fields such
13
as consumer credit, tourism, and time-sharing contracts.
This seems to be a narrow scope of application for collective
remedies, and the recent implementation experience in Germany is
not very promising with respect to the introduction of a more general
and progressive concept of group litigation. But on the other hand,
the momentum the Directive can give to new developments should
not be underestimated. At the very least, it is recognition of a function of civil procedure in Europe that to a great extent was previously
14
denied—its capacity for collective and public interest protection.
Also, in Article 6 of the Directive, the Commission is obligated to
give a report to Parliament and Counsel after three years, not only on
the experiences, but also on possible extensions of the substantive
scope of application.15
III. DIFFERENT TYPES OF GROUP LITIGATION
This Section describes the different types of European group actions, characterized by the kind of relief sought and the interests represented.
A. Injunctive Relief
As already indicated by the European Directive’s title, the associations’ suit generated by the Directive is limited to injunctive relief.
This was true before the Directive came into force in some of the
countries where the associations’ actions had been practiced, such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux coun-

13. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3.
14. See Reinhard Greger, Verbandsklage und Prozessdogmatik - Neue Entwicklungen in
einer schwiergen Beziehung, 113 ZZP 339 (2000) (for critiques of this “collectivist” development).
15. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3.
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tries. In these countries, the associations’ right of action for an in16
junction is established. In some countries, however, this right of action exists only in the consumer law area; thus, consumer associations
have standing. However, in other countries, the right of action is also
assigned to other organizations, such as business federations, unions,
environmental associations, and chambers of commerce.17 This type
of collective action is used for the control and enforcement of competition and business standards, industrial property rules, environmental
law, etc. It therefore follows that this remedy is in fact a public interest tool; it pursues the public interest using effective law enforcement,
since the traditional (European) instruments of control and law enforcement by administration are insufficient.18
B. Damages Relief
Damages in the traditional civil law perception exist primarily to
compensate the individual victim, whereas the public interest primarily stands for regulation and control and thus focuses on the violator
and effective sanctions. Because these are two very different objectives, associations’ suits for damages seem incompatible with traditional concepts of civil liability. In France and Greece, where associations’ suits are frequently used for damages relief (see supra note 8),
the notion of damages differs greatly from the idea of an individual
burden to be compensated. The notion of “dommage collectif” does
not mean the simple accumulation of numerous individual claims, but
rather a nominal, or a non-material, lump-sum that cannot be exactly
calculated and proved; it is used merely for its symbolic meaning (“1
franc symbolique”), as it is usually awarded in the context of criminal
19
proceedings against the violator. Recently, however, the awards in
“actions civiles” brought by associations have become increasingly
larger and sometimes take the character of deterrent or punitive
damages (“peine privée”).20
In Greece, damages are not necessarily afforded to the association as they are not conceived as calculable compensation of specific
16. See supra note 6 (for detailed references). See Koch, supra note 2 (for Germany).
17. See id.
18. See HARALD KOCH, PROZESSFÜHRUNG IM ÖFFENTLICHEN INTERESSE 71 et seq.
(1983); Anne Morin, L’action de’intérêt collectif exercée par les organisations de consommateurs
avant et après la loi du 5 janvier 1988, in Bourgoignie, supra note 9, at 57, 76 et seq. (as to the
comparative evaluation of criminal/administrative and private law enforcement).
19. Puttfarken & Franke, supra note 11, at 174; Morin, supra note 18, at 65.
20. See Puttfarken & Franke, supra note 11, at 176 (for detailed references to French
cases).
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losses. Rather, the association sues for non-monetary, intangible
losses that are usually awarded in a lump-sum and must be used only
for charitable purposes. The preventive, sometimes punitive, character of this type of action is obvious.21
C. Associations’ Right of Action
Associations suing for a specific group whose members can be
identified represent a completely different constituency. Here, it is
not the public interest or the substantive or political advantage of a
diffuse fraction of society (such as consumers or environmentalists)
that is vindicated by the association; instead, it is the procedural representation of a certain group of claimants whose rights are collected
for purposes of procedural economy. This can be dealt with by traditional procedural instruments of representation, such as mandate or
assignment, and therefore does not require special legislation. Under
these principles, associations could sue for damages even if it is their
members’ claims (assigned to them) that they are asserting. In mass
tort situations, there is a possibility that an ad-hoc interest group may
represent the members in negotiations and in legal proceedings. In
Germany, this grouping of numerous claims under the control of an
attorney (or by the court’s initiative) is possible and often used.22
What runs into considerable opposition, however, is the formal and
professional representation of such accumulated claims by an association. An old statute banning non-lawyers from counseling and dealing with legal matters is still zealously used by the organized bar in
23
order to prevent unethical solicitation of business. Under European
rules of freedom of establishment and services, it is doubtful that
such restrictions on offering legal services are still maintainable; the
European Court of Justice seems to be moving in a more and more
liberal direction.24

21. See Papathoma-Baetge, supra note 11, at 201
22. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) [hereinafter BGH] Oct.
27, 1983, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter NJW], (1984), 2220; Rainer Wunderlich,
Zivilprozessuale Möglichkeiten für ein gemeinschaftliches Vorgehen geschädigter Kapitalanleger,
46 DER BETRIEB 2269 (1993); Koch, supra note 2, 4 CIV. J. Q. 66, 74 et seq. (1986).
23. RECHTSBERATUNGSGESETZ [Statute on Legal Counselling] v. 13.12.1935, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl. I p. 1478]. For numerous examples cf. GÜNTER RENNEN & GABRIELE
CALIEBE, RECHTSBERATUNGSGESETZ (3rd ed. 2001), art. 1 § 1.
24. See Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede v. Sandker, E.C.R. 6188 (1996) (such tendencies
can be gathered from this case).
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D. Public Rights of Action
Since law enforcement in the civil law tradition is the administration’s function, it may not come as a surprise that in some countries, it
is primarily public institutions that are granted a right of action in civil
procedure. The European Injunction Directive provides for a right of
action for “independent public bodies” as an alternative to the associations’ suit (art. 3, lit. a), reflecting English and Scandinavian experiences with procedural initiatives that can be taken by independent
agencies or the Ombudsman. In Scandinavia, the Consumer Ombudsman is granted a mandate to control illegal and unfair practices
by negotiation, recommendation, or enjoinment, and sometimes even
25
through the issuance of criminal fines towards illegal businesses.
The Ombudsman cannot, however, sue for damages. Although the
Ombudsman tradition is generally considered successful in Scandinavia, the lack of damages relief may explain why the introduction of a
group action-style class action (“grupptalan”) is being seriously considered in Sweden (the Lindblom proposal) and in Norway (Norwegian Civil Procedure Commission).26
In England, the Director General of Fair Trading has an independent right of action in consumer matters. It is restricted, however,
to injunctions (sec. 37 of the Fair Trading Act of 1973) and is seldom
used. This may be due to staff limitations, as well as sufficient extra27
judicial control activities of the Office of Fair Trading.
Irrespective of the differing national rules, in general there remains serious objection to collective interest representation by the
government; even if an Ombudsman or an agency is formally independent and free from government supervision, it will always have to
rely on government funding and therefore its political autonomy
might be limited.

25. See Roberth Nordh, Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms, and a Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 381
(2001).
26. See also Per-Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal on Group Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 - 831 (1997)
(for a perspective on Sweden).
27. See Office of Fair Trading (Britain), 1992 ANNUAL REPORT; Ellger, supra note 10, at
125.
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IV. PROCEDURAL CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing comparative survey of some European tools for
collective litigation now allows me to draw some procedural conclusions.
A. Damages
First, what are the special problems that Europeans have with
non-injunctive remedies? The confinement of the European Directive to injunctive relief may be due to a realistic assessment of the acceptance of harmonization proposals in the EU. To be sure, it does
not prevent member states from taking more far-reaching steps in the
28
process of national implementation of the Directive. However, associations’ suits for true damages (class-action style) are running into
stiff opposition—at least in Germany.29 Proposals are criticized as advocating deeply socialist reforms; such critiques obviously confuse the
collective—hence efficient—use of procedural tools with socialism!
There are other obstacles that civilians have to overcome if they
are serious about compensating for deficits in effective law enforcement in cases of widespread petty injuries and damages. The most
important problem is the traditional understanding of damages as a
means of purely compensating the victim (i.e., restoring the victim to
his or her former position). What is necessary is a change of perspective towards the regulative and preventive functions of civil liability.
Economists and comparativists have already taught us much about
30
this change, and there are some indications in that direction in the
31
case law of several European high courts.
Second, there is the rather narrow notion of special damages that
can only be awarded under European laws, in particular in Germany.
Except for pain and suffering and violation of privacy, there is no
28. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3, art. 7.
29. See Greger, supra note 14, at 411; Klaus Oepen [Bericht uber die Diskussion] report on
the discussion of Koch’s proposals: 113 ZZP 443 et seq. (2000).
30. See, e.g., J. P. Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. ST. 323
(1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 et seq. (4th ed. 1992); UGO
MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); see also Schäfer, Anreizwirkung bei der
Class Action und der Verbandsklage, in Basedow et al., supra note 9, at 67 (from a German perspective); Gerhard Wagner, Haftung und Versicherung als Instrumente der Techniksteuerung, 50
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1441 (1999); Harald Koch, Präventions—und Steuerungswirkung des
Schuld—und Wettbewerbsrechts 19 JURISTENZEITUNG 922, 930 (1999).
31. See, e.g., Cassell and Co. Ltd. v. Broome, H.L. 1027 at 1078 et seq (A. C. 1972) (per
Lord Hailsham, at 1119 per Lord Wilbeforce); BGH 15.11.1994—Caroline of Monaco—NJW,
(1995), 861.

KOCH.DOC

364

08/06/01 1:33 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 11:355

possibility under German law for non-material damages that cannot
32
be exactly calculated. However, it is possible to estimate material
damages if the effort of ascertaining the exact amount would be unreasonable,33 and this could also be used to estimate collective damages in situations of widespread losses.
Finally, the distribution of a damage award among victims of a
violation is a management-like procedure to which civilian courts are
purportedly ill-accustomed. What skeptics of any new judicial task
forget is that there is already a field of activity and experience where
courts must often manage the distribution of a fund among numerous
claimants: bankruptcy. Thus, there are dispositions for a more extensive development of collective remedies already de lege lata.
B. Judicial Certification
Judicial certification and control of representation are additional
procedural tools necessary to prevent the misuse of collective proceedings. The EU Directive and its implementing legislation in Germany provides for a certification procedure for an association that
34
wishes to engage in litigation in the consumer field. Such an association can only be admitted and registered if it has at least seventy-five
individual members or is a parent organization of other consumer associations. The business community in Germany is particularly suspicious of the misuse of the associations’ right of action, and since the
judiciary is afraid of being overwhelmed by too many proceedings
brought by self-appointed champions of the public interest, it has
provided for a general misuse clause in the Unfair Competition Statute.35 Thus, the courts have the discretion to admit only serious associations.
C. Prior Consultation Proceeding
In order to save the courts from premature group demands, the
36
EU Directive suggests a prior consultation proceeding. An association that intends to ask for an injunction may start the procedure after
32. See BASIL MARKESINIS, GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, VOL. 2: LAW OF TORT (3rd
ed. 1997); GERT BRUEGGEMEIER, PRINZIPIEN DES HAFTUNGSRECHTS 182 et seq. (1999).
33. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [German Civil Procedure Code] v.12.9.1950, §
287 [BGBl I p. 533] (which gives the court discretionary power to ascertain the origin and
amount of damages).
34. See Directive 98/27/EC supra note 3, art. 4; AGBG sec. 22(a).
35. See UWG § 13 (5).
36. See Directive 98/27/EC supra note 3, art. 5.
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trying to stop the alleged infringement via consultation with the defendant. Germany has not picked up this suggestion because it has
other means of preventing plaintiffs from suing. These are mainly
cost disadvantages; if the defendant in an early stage of the proceeding recognizes the claim of a plaintiff who failed to demand that the
defendant comply with his obligation, then the costs of the lawsuit
will be charged to the plaintiff, even though he or she won the case.37
D. The Costs of Group Litigation and the Role of Attorneys
This brings us to my final point: the costs of group litigation and
the role of attorneys. The crucial role that the costs of litigation play
for the significance (or insignificance) of nearly every procedural rule
and arrangement cannot be overemphasized. It is not necessary in
this context to comment on the importance of attorneys’ fees and
their allotment in damages class actions; however, the “American
rule” and contingency fee arrangements are unknown in Europe and
thus must be considered if we want to learn from each other. Instead,
I want to sketch very briefly the financing rules in associations’ suits
in some European jurisdictions.
Collective and public interest litigation needs some kind of discharge of the plaintiff’s risk, as the individual plaintiff obviously does
not litigate for his own economic advantage. The respective cost rules
for most European countries can be arranged in two categories. The
first is public funding of the associations and their lawyers and/or no
38
fees for public interest litigation. The second is financing “via the
market” or abiding by the European rule of costs (the loser pays principle).
However, following this market rule, even in public interest litigation by associations, there could be a major obstacle to the efficient
use of procedural remedies. In particular, if courts’ expenses and attorneys’ fees are calculated by a percentage of the amount in controversy (which is the rule in Germany), the risk involved in losing a case
of great public importance and then having to pay all the costs (including the opposing attorneys’ fees) would severely reduce these
semi-public and necessary control activities. Therefore, in light of the
37. See ZPO § 93.
38. See UWG, § 23 b; MARKENGESETZ [Trademark Act] v. 25.10.1994 § 142 [BGBl I p.
3083]; AKTIENGESETZ [Stock Corporation Act] v. 6.9.1965 § 247 (2) [BGBl. I p. 1089] (in
Germany, consumer associations engaging in litigation are largely publicly funded; other means
of subsidizing public interest litigation include the court’s power to reduce the amount-incontroversy (which is conclusive for the fees)).
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law enforcement functions served by the associations’ suits, they
should at least be co-financed by public subsidies. Of course, the associations’ proceeds from delivering chargeable services, publications,
and tests, as well as from membership dues, could be used as financ39
ing resources as well.
V. PROSPECTS
A general appraisal of the prospects of group litigation in Europe
must take into consideration both the European and the member
states’ level of legislation. The future of group litigation will be dictated by two factors: the demand for more effective enforcement in
certain substantive areas and the demands of the procedural economy. Among the most important substantive fields of law covered in
the EU Treaties are environmental and consumer protection. In
these fields, the need for legal action is considered to be very high,
and since standard behavior and mass phenomena are very common
in both fields, violations of legal rules may lead to widespread injury
and therefore the respective remedies must be adequate. The policy
programs of the EC Commission in consumer and environmental law
expressly provide for reforms of procedural instruments to more effectively realize their substantive policy goals.40
The second factor of determination is the demands of procedural
economy, and it is this combination of substantive policy and procedural needs that will force European legislators to invigorate collective and public interest functions of civil procedure to a much greater
extent than recognized before. Whether it opts for a class action
model, an association’s suit or another form of public representation
depends largely on procedural traditions in the respective countries
and the political power of organized interests, including the bar and
the judiciary. It seems that in most continental European countries,
an association’s suit is more easily compatible with traditional principles of legitimate representation, public responsibility, and procedural economy. The step to a new procedural dimension, however, is
the extension of all forms of collective proceedings to a damages remedy. The history of the American Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) strikingly demonstrates that group litigation becomes a real
39. Cf. Koch, supra, note 5, at 431(my proposals as to that effect).
40. See Greenbook on Consumer Access to Law and Conciliation of Consumer Disputes in
the Internal Market, COM(93)576 final, at 60, 92; Consumer Policy Action Plan, COM(98)696
final, at 21, 22. See also Greenbook on Civil Liability for Dangerous Products, COM(99)396
final, at 31, 32.
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political and social force for change as soon as it asks for damages and
thus leads to adequate compensation, as well as to perceptible sanctions for wrongdoing. It is this remedy that makes the class action, as
well as the associations’ suit, a powerful tool for effective law enforcement.

